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Abstract 
Low teacher motivation and its detrimental effect on student achievement are central 
problems of many education systems in Africa. Using standardized data for student 
achievement in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar and Senegal, this 
paper analyzes the empirical links between various policy measures, teacher job 
satisfaction and primary education outcomes. It appears that there is only very limited 
evidence for the effectiveness of intensively debated and costly measures such as 
reducing class size, increasing academic qualification requirements, and increasing 
teachers salaries. Other, simpler measures such as an increased provision of textbooks 
are both more effective and less costly. 
It also appears that teacher job satisfaction and education quality are not 
necessarily complementary objectives. Especially those measures ensuring control and 
incentive related working conditions for teachers, significantly increase student 
achievement while reducing teacher job satisfaction. In addition, teachers’ academic 
qualification beyond the “baccalauréat”, while beneficial for students’ learning, tends to 
lead to a mismatch between teachers’ expectations and professional realities, and 
thereby reduces teachers’ job satisfaction. 
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1. Introduction 
The role of teachers is crucial for the transfer of knowledge in schools. At the 
same time, teachers’ remuneration is the biggest cost factor in educational finance. In 
most countries, developing and industrialized alike, teachers’ salaries account for 
between half and three fourth of current education expenditure. In some African 
countries, their part rises up to 90% (World Bank 2003). Given the magnitude of the 
financial investment involved, it is extremely important to know whether these funds 
are used efficiently.  
In Africa, a major political topic in this context is how to resolve the problem of 
low teacher motivation and its detrimental effect on student achievement. In several 
countries, recent attempts to reduce cost through the engagement of teachers on non-
civil servant contracts (“voluntary teachers”) as well as generally declining salaries have 
provoked heavy protests of teachers’ unions. The literature is full of apparently obvious 
policy recommendations, in particular the raising of teachers’ salaries and reductions in 
class size (see e.g. UNICEF 1999, p. 39, AfDB 1998, p. 197, Maclure 1997, p. 52, 
N’guilé 2000, Chivore 1988). This corresponds to what teachers themselves claim to be 
responsible for their demotivation, not only in developing countries, but in general 
(Spear, Gould and Lee 2000). However, in-depth analysis for developing countries is 
rare and generally concentrates on the aspect of job satisfaction alone. The link to 
education quality has been difficult to establish so far, since there were no suitable data 
on student achievement until the late 1990s. 
Another, more recent strand of the literature does not consider teacher job 
satisfaction as an objective in itself. It is concerned with incentives for quality education 
whereby the teacher is merely seen as an instrument. Finally, there is a rapidly growing 
literature on determinants of student achievement, mainly based on the estimation of 
education production functions. However, the aspect of teachers’ job satisfaction is 
typically neglected in this context.  
This paper intends to bridge the gap between the different strands of the 
literature. It attempts an initial empirical analysis for francophone, sub-Saharan Africa 
in which both aspects, teacher job satisfaction and the ultimate objective of educational 
quality, will be equally considered. The analysis will be based on the exceptionally rich 
database of the “Program of Analysis of Education Systems” (PASEC) managed under 
the authority of the conference of francophone education ministers (CONFEMEN).1  
Three questions will be addressed: 
                                                
1 Original French names: PASEC: Programme d’Analyse des Systèmes Educatifs des Pays de la 
CONFEMEN; CONFEMEN: Conférence des Ministres de l’Éducation des Pays ayant le Français en 
Partage. Data and first analytical reports are available on CD-Rom from the CONFEMEN (CONFEMEN 
1999). If interested please contact the managing team at pasec@sentoo.sn. 
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 What are the factors determining teachers’ job satisfaction? 
 How does teachers’ job satisfaction translate into learning outcomes? 
 Which cost efficient measures could be suggested in order to simultaneously 
increase both teachers’ job satisfaction and education quality? 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a more detailed review of 
the literature on teacher job satisfaction and incentives. Section 3 discusses the PASEC 
dataset and its suitability for the analysis of teachers’ motivation and education quality. 
Section 4 describes the actual state of teachers’ job satisfaction based on different 
sources and variables. Sections 5 to 7 econometrically address the three analytical 
questions raised above, and section 8 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. An overview of existing literature 
This study draws from earlier work in various disciplines: educational science and 
pedagogy, organizational theory, and economics. Unfortunately, these different strands 
of the literature have so far developed in a rather disconnected manner. 
For several reasons, teacher job satisfaction has always been an important issue 
in empirical pedagogical research: First, job satisfaction is considered to have an effect 
on the quality of teaching and on the school achievement of pupils (e.g. Somech and 
Drach-Zahavy 2000; Nabi 1995; Menlo and Poppleton 1990). Second, it has been found 
to predict withdrawal cognition (Lam, Foong and Moo 1995; Hall, Pearson and Carroll 
1992), and may therefore be seen as an important aspect in maintaining the stability of 
the teaching staff. And third, teacher job satisfaction is supposed to contribute to the 
quality of teacher work-life, making their professional experience an element of 
psychological health (Menlo and Poppleton 1990), personal fulfillment and growth. 
This might be perceived as an objective in itself (Garrett 1999). 
While teacher job satisfaction in general has attracted a broad range of 
pedagogical research, only little attention has been paid to teacher job satisfaction in 
developing countries. However, it seems clear that teacher job satisfaction in developing 
countries might be influenced by factors that are different from those affecting teacher 
job satisfaction in the North, where most of the teacher job satisfaction research has 
been carried out. For instance, questions of basic educational infrastructure or teacher 
salaries could play a higher role in countries where education may happen under a tree, 
and where many teachers can hardly afford their living and may need second and third 
jobs to cover the basic needs of their families. Indeed, existing literature on teacher job 
satisfaction in developing countries, and specifically in Africa, generally suggests a 
stronger emphasis on monetary aspects and, perhaps more surprisingly, on teacher 
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family surroundings (see e.g. Chivore 1988 for Zambia, Abangma 1981 for the 
Anglophone part of Cameroon, Banya and Elu 1997 for Sierra Leone, and Postlethwaite 
1998 for Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda). It should be noted that most of this literature 
analyzes teachers’ own perceptions about the factors relevant for their (de)motivation. 
Results are thus subjective, may change over time and with circumstances, and do not 
necessarily imply that teachers working under ‘improved’ conditions according to some 
objective measure of these criteria, are indeed more motivated on their job. This 
problem does not arise when working with separate indicators of job satisfaction on the 
one hand, and teaching conditions on the other hand, as we will do in our study. 
The more theoretical part of the literature by educational scientists draws from 
the general concepts of motivation and job satisfaction typically developed in the 
context of the theory of organization. Apart from Maslow’s (1954) well known 
hierarchy of needs which, in our context, also stresses the relevance of a separate 
analysis of teacher job satisfaction for developing countries, the most common basis of 
theoretical analysis is Herzberg’s (1968) famous two-factor model and extensions 
thereof. However, no consensus has yet been found, and the literature does not offer a 
uniform theoretical concept of job satisfaction so far (see e.g. Evans 1997, for 
discussion).  
Moreover, the general concepts of job satisfaction have been questioned in terms 
of their applicability to the field of teacher work (e.g. Nias 1981, Evans 1997). 
Following Barnabé and Burns (1994), teaching differs from other professions regarding 
several aspects: the job is mostly carried out isolated from other adults, and teachers are 
also isolated when preparing lessons. So, teachers might be different from other 
workforce because they spend most of their time either working alone or together with 
pupils. Wittmann (2002) and Garrett (1999) provide interesting literature reviews of job 
satisfaction and motivation theory with respect to teachers and schools.  
While drawing from this literature, in our own study, the definition of job 
satisfaction used will be very pragmatic and based on the data at hand. It will simply 
indicate whether the teachers do or do not like their job. No specific distinction is made 
between satisfaction and dissatisfaction as models such as Herzberg’s (1968) two-factor 
analysis would suggest. Moreover, when we talk about motivation, we simply mean the 
transformation of job satisfaction into effort at work. 
Almost totally separate from the literature reviewed so far, but driven by recent 
political developments in many countries, economists have shown a growing interest in 
the issue of how incentives could be generated for better teaching. Interestingly, while 
the pedagogical literature is largely teacher centered, often taking the positive 
relationship between teacher job satisfaction and improved education quality simply for 
 4 
granted, the economic literature is largely student centered without any consideration of 
the needs of the teachers as such. While teacher attitudes are considered important, they 
are merely seen as an instrument, and not as an objective in its own right. Again, the 
bulk of the literature considers education in the North, notably in the United States. 
However, there are some exceptions such as Chaudhury et al. (2006), Duflo and Hanna 
(2005), Banerjee and Duflo (2006), and Bourdon, Frölich and Michaelowa (2006). 
Reinikka and Svensson (2003) and Francken, Minten and Swinnen (2005) consider 
related questions of transparency and community monitoring in Uganda and 
Madagascar, but with a focus on the general administration rather than on teachers. 
Reviewing the general literature on incentives in education systems, Wößmann (2006) 
attempts to draw lessons for the specific case of developing countries.  
The literature typically covers one or more of the following aspects of possible 
incentive systems: general control systems, community monitoring, contract conditions, 
performance based (or simply presence based) salaries, school choice and standardized 
exams as a monitoring tool. It also attempts to establish the relative efficiency of 
different of these measures, either theoretically (see e.g. Jaag 2005) or empirically and 
in terms of practical implementation constraints (Banerjee and Duflo 2005). Glewwe 
and Kremer (2006) provide a useful overview of the specific literature for developing 
countries. 
As our study intends to directly empirically relate teacher job satisfaction and its 
determinants to education quality measured by student achievement, it is also related to 
the large research on education production functions which econometrically searches for 
effective learning inputs. For Africa, examples of studies covering several countries are 
Michaelowa (2001a), Lee, Zuze and Ross (2005), and Michaelowa and Wechtler 
(2006). Moreover, interesting studies partially based on experiments have been carried 
out by Glewwe et al. (2004) and Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin (2000) in Kenya, as well 
as by Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) in Ghana. The outcomes of this literature will help us 
to select the relevant variables for our final empirical model.  
 
3. The PASEC dataset 
In order to bring together these different strands of the literature in an empirical analysis 
of teacher job satisfaction and student achievement, and in order to finally determine the 
joint determinants of both objectives, our analysis requires a rich dataset with 
information on education quality (measured directly in terms of learning achievement) 
as well as background information on students, teachers and schools. To draw 
conclusions about job satisfaction, detailed information on teachers is particularly 
relevant. The PASEC dataset does fulfill these requirements. Data are derived from a 
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stratified random sample of classrooms at different grade levels of primary education in 
several sub-Saharan African countries. In order to maximize the available number of 
observations, this study jointly uses the data for Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Madagascar and Senegal for which internationally comparable information is 
available. Between 1995 and 1998 standardized tests in math and French were 
administered in primary schools of all five countries together with a collection of 
information on the students’ socio-economic background and school variables that were 
collected using both teacher and director questionnaires. Concerning Cameroon, it 
should be noted that the country runs two parallel education systems, one in English and 
one in French. Only the francophone system is considered here. 
Among the datasets providing internationally comparable data on student 
achievement and background variables PASEC has the advantage that it systematically 
includes pre-tests at the beginning of the academic year. This is not the case for the few 
other standardized surveys for developing countries, and not even for the most well-
known international surveys mainly covering industrialized countries such as TIMSS or 
PISA.2 However, only the correction for results at pre-tests allows for a precise 
acknowledgement of learning within a specific year. Since teachers often change from 
one year to the next, this is crucial for the outcome oriented evaluation of all teacher 
related variables - including job satisfaction. 
Since there is strong evidence that the effects of various variables on student 
learning is not independent of the class level considered (Bernard 1999), information of 
different grades should not be pooled. To simplify the analysis, this study focuses on a 
single grade level. While the full dataset is available for both second and fifth grade 
students and teachers, only information concerning the fifth grade was included into this 
analysis. This is the last grade of primary education in Madagascar, and the second 
highest grade in the other four countries covered by the sample. For this grade level, the 
PASEC database contains information on learning achievement for between 2000 and 
2500 children in about 100 primary schools in each of the five countries. The items 
selected for the tests were discussed among education specialists and members of the 
different education ministries in order to equally reflect the curricula in all countries. 
For all tests Cronbach’s alpha, the numerical coefficient of reliability, is between 78% 
                                                
2 Similar surveys in the developing world were initiated for a couple of English speaking sub-Saharan 
African countries by the Southern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) 
and for Latin-American countries by the “Laboratory Project” of UNESCO-Santiago. For an overview 
and initial results see Ross (1998) and UNESCO-Santiago (1998) respectively. For information on 
TIMSS and PISA see IEA (2001), OECD (2001) and OECD/UNESCO-UIS (2003). 
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and 84%. This shows a good inter-item consistency and a high probability that carrying 
out the same test again would lead to very similar results.3  
One shortcoming of the PASEC dataset is, however, the high number of missing 
values for a considerable number of variables both at student and at school level. In 
many regressions, this problem reduces the number of observations to 60%-70% of the 
total number of students and schools in the sample. Unfortunately, the problem is 
particularly strong for some of the teacher variables most relevant here. A second factor 
limiting the suitability of the dataset for the analysis of teachers’ job satisfaction is that 
no information is available on individual teachers’ salaries, which are often expected to 
be one of the important extrinsic determinants.  
 
4. Evidence on teachers’ job satisfaction 
Before entering into the actual analysis, it appears useful to gain an impression of how 
satisfied teachers actually are about their work in the countries considered here. As 
mentioned above, our definition of job satisfaction is rather simple and supposed to 
indicate whether teachers do or do not like their job. In our data, the most important 
indication is given by the teachers’ own answers to the question which profession they 
would choose if they had to choose once again. Teachers had to opt for either the 
medical, the judicial, the agricultural, the technical, the financial, the commercial, or 
again the teaching profession. Regrouping the answers, a binary variable (JOBSATIS) 
can be created indicating whether the teacher would choose his or her profession again 
(JOBSATIS=1), or whether he or she would not (JOBSATIS=0). 
Two other variables can be used to complement and countercheck the relevance 
of this variable. The first is teachers’ desire to change the school if they had the 
occasion to do so. Their answer is again captured by a binary variable (CHANGE) that 
takes the value 1 if they would like to change the school, and the value 0 if they would 
not. The second variable captures the number of working days teachers were absent 
during the month before the survey (ABSENCE). Unfortunately, just as for the other 
two variables, the information is collected only by self-reporting, which probably leads 
to some understatement whenever respondents do not trust the anonymity of the 
questionnaire. The fear to reveal the truth also appears to have resulted in a high number 
of missing values for this particular variable. Moreover, teachers apparently did not 
always understand the question, since some figures exceed the maximum number of 
working days in a month. In these cases, the value of the variable was adjusted to 
ABSENCE=25 for the purpose of this study. 
                                                
3 A detailed description of the data is provided by CONFEMEN (1999). 
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Assuming that, on average, teachers satisfied with their work would (i) choose 
their profession again, (ii) be happy to stay in the same school, and (iii) will be absent 
less often than other teachers, Table 1 provides an overall impression of teacher job 
satisfaction for the five countries in the sample. 
Overall, more than 50% of fifth grade teachers seem to prefer teaching to any 
other profession, and over 40% like their schools and do not want to change. The 
situation therefore does not correspond to the desperate picture of a generally 
demoralized teaching profession suggested by many African sources (for an overview, 
see Maclure 1997, ch. 4). At the same time, as almost half of the teachers would prefer 
another job, and almost 60% would like to change schools, there is definitely much 
room for improvement.  
 
Table 1:  Indicators of teacher job satisfaction in francophone Africa, 1995-1998 
 
 Burkina Faso Cameroon Côte d’Ivoire Madagascar Senegal Total 
Share of teachers who would 
choose the same profession 
again (JOBSATIS=1), in % 
56.7 
(4.9) 
55.8 
(5.1) 
45.8 
(4.6) 
65.5 
(4.4) 
40.6 
(5.0) 
53.2 
(4.8) 
 
Share of teachers who would 
like to change schools 
(CHANGE=1), in % 
43.3 
(4.9) 
38.9 
(5.0) 
54.2 
(4.6) 
23.5 
(3.9) 
61.5 
(5.0) 
43.8 
(4.7) 
Teachers’ average absence 
(ABSENCE), in working 
days/month  
2.24 
(0.38) 
1.80 
(0.39) 
1.28 
(0.16) 
2.50 
(0.42) 
4.72 
(0.54) 
2.39 
(0.38) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Moreover, absenteeism appears to be a serious problem. PASEC data indicate 
that teachers, on average, miss their classes for about half a week per month. Assuming 
that teachers understate rather than overstate their absence, and that they tend to deny 
reporting when their absenteeism is particularly pronounced, the true situation can be 
presumed to be even worse. 
However, Table 1 also shows that there are significant differences between 
individual countries. The situation is clearly the worst in Senegal where the average 
teacher is absent about twice as often as in all other countries. The other indicators point 
in the same direction: more than 60% of teachers would like to change schools if they 
had the occasion, and only slightly above 40% would choose the teaching profession 
again. In both cases, the figure indicates a lower job satisfaction than in any other 
country, and significantly differs from the country average. 
Côte d’Ivoire also shows a relatively low level of job satisfaction. While the 
share of teachers who would again choose the teaching profession is considerably 
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higher and the share of teachers willing to change schools is considerably lower than in 
Senegal, these differences are not significant at a level of 5%. Only with respect to its 
comparatively low absence rates does Côte d’Ivoire show a significantly better result 
than Senegal. 
At the other end of the scale, there is Madagascar, with about average absence 
rates but an exceptionally strong preference for both teachers’ current profession and 
institution. Over 65% would choose the same profession again, and only 23.5% would 
like to change schools. Burkina Faso and Cameroon are in between. 
It is interesting to devote some attention to the relationship between the three 
indicators. The presentation of country means has already suggested a significant 
negative correlation between the preference for the teaching profession and the desire to 
change schools. If JOBSATIS correctly reflects teachers’ general liking of their job, one 
should indeed expect them to also show a certain appreciation of their place of work. 
Similarly, if JOBSATIS is correctly specified, one should expect this variable to be 
negatively related to teachers’ absence rates. However, the latter relationship is neither 
clear in the above country comparison, nor does it turn out to be significant when 
calculating the chi-square test based on the contingency table for these variables. 
Contingency coefficients are presented in Table 2. For this purpose, the variable 
ABSENCE was temporarily recoded into a discrete variable with three categories (0, 1-
2, and 3 or more days of absence). Contingency coefficients appeared to be reasonably 
robust with respect to alternative classifications of the data. 
 
Table 2:  Bivariate contingency coefficients 
 
JOBSATIS CHANGE ABSENCE 
JOBSATIS 1 0.172*** 0.071 
CHANGE 0.172*** 1 0.111* 
ABSENCE 0.071 0.111* 1 
Note: ***significant at α=0.01, *significant at α=0.10. 
 
One major reason for the missing link between ABSENCE and JOBSATIS 
might be that the relation between both variables is hidden through the influence of 
additional variables. It might also be the case that ABSENCE stands for a different 
dimension of job satisfaction and must therefore be considered as a fully 
complementary measure. Finally, it could be that the missing link between both 
variables is a consequence of (partly country specific) factors that are independent of 
the teachers’ positive or negative feelings about their job. Concerning the variable 
CHANGE, to a certain extent, similar questions arise, even though the correlation with 
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JOBSATIS is highly significant. These questions will all be discussed in the next 
section that attempts to analyze the determinants of teacher job satisfaction. 
 
5. Determinants of teacher job satisfaction 
In order to derive the determinants of teacher job satisfaction, the three indicators 
presented above will be regressed on five groups of variables: 
 
 Variables describing the classroom environment and school facilities (class size 
and structure, students’ initial performance, availability of books, electricity, tables, 
blackboards and other equipment, proximity of the next city...) 
 Variables describing the teachers own characteristics (gender, family status, job 
experience, qualification...) 
 Variables describing the teacher’s contract conditions (civil servant or private 
employee, job perspectives, additional work apart from teaching...) 
 Variables describing the human relations, teacher’s supervision and 
responsibilities (exchange with colleagues, meetings with the director, control by 
parents and school inspectors...) 
 Country dummies to capture country-specific differences. 
 
Finally, JOBSATIS will be considered as an explanatory variable for both 
CHANGE and ABSENCE so as to gain some further insight into the relationship 
between these variables. 
Generally, the explanatory variables selected here reflect the relevant extrinsic 
and intrinsic predictors of teacher job satisfaction discussed in the literature, notably 
based on situational models of job satisfaction (see e.g. Hoy and Miskel 1996). It is 
expected that teacher job satisfaction will be enhanced by a well equipped school 
environment, adequate training, and contract conditions which ensure long-term job 
prospects, security and a decent salary. Moreover, teacher job satisfaction will probably 
benefit from a positive exchange with colleagues, the director and students’ parents, but 
it might suffer from pressure via control. Other variables, such as teachers’ family status 
and gender, are included as control variables. 
 
5.1. Methodology 
In order to test these hypotheses, a probit model will be estimated for the two binary 
dependent variables JOBSATIS and CHANGE. The probit model takes into account the 
specificities of discrete choice. It uses a non-linear regression approach because linear 
predictions would tend to be out range in many cases, and it considers some underlying 
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latent variable, e.g. some unobserved continuous variable reflecting the teacher’s 
feelings about his or her job. Only when positive feelings exceed a certain threshold, the 
teacher will be ready to opt for the same profession again (or opt for staying in the same 
school).  
For the variable ABSENCE, a tobit regression model is used so as to capture left 
censoring at 0 and right censoring at 25 (the minimum and the maximum of working 
days a teacher can be absent within a month). The tobit model combines the features of 
an ordinary regression for continuous dependent variables, and the features of binary 
choice models. The latter is necessary due to the censoring. We may again imagine an 
underlying continuous variable, in this case indicating a disposition for missing on the 
job. Within the month which is referred to in the teachers’ response, this variable is 
observed between 1 and 25. However, the disposition can be extremely bad (>25) or 
extremely good (<0) and this will no more be reflected in the data observed. Thus 
beyond the two limits, we have to again deal with latent variables. This is precisely 
what the tobit model takes into account. See Greene (2003, Ch. 21 and 22.3) for further 
explanations for both probit and tobit models. 
 
5.2. Results 
Table 3 presents the results. For each dependent variable, two regressions are displayed. 
The first includes a high number of explanatory variables while the second is limited to 
those with the highest explanatory power. In this way, the table offers both a general 
insight into the range of variables tested and an overview of the optimal model. Detailed 
variable descriptions are provided in the appendix. 
 
Classroom environment 
Variables to capture the influence of the classroom environment include 
students’ average knowledge level measured at the beginning of the school year 
(RATE1 and RATESN14), class size (STUDNUMB), and specific aspects of 
organization such as several grade levels within a single class (MULTGRADE) and 
different classes using the same classroom at different times of the day – generally with 
the same teacher (DOUBLSHIFT). Classroom equipment is measured by an index 
combining very basic items such as a blackboard, chalk, benches, tables, etc. 
(BASEQUIP), the availability of textbooks for both math and French (BOOKS), of 
teacher guide books (GUIDE), and of electricity (ELECTR). It is also considered  
 
                                                
4 For Senegal the separate variable RATESN1 had to be introduced since in this country, the pre-test 
differed from the standardized version of the other four countries. 
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Table 3: Determinants of teacher job satisfaction 
 
Dependent Variable: JOBSATIS JOBSATIS CHANGE CHANGE ABSENCE ABSENCE 
Method: ML-Probit ML-Probit ML-Probit ML-Probit ML-Tobit ML-Tobit 
N 403  504  403  497  353  384  
Expl. Variables Coef. Regr. 1 Coef. Regr. 2 Coef. Regr. 3 Coef. Regr. 4 Coef. Regr. 5 Coef. Regr. 6 
       
Classroom environment      
RATE1 0.3371   -1.3170  -1.4602 ** -3.3817   
RATESN1 1.8411   1.6571  1.9988  -11.2712   
STUDNUMB -0.0065 * -0.0059 ** -0.0044  -0.0044  -0.0071   
MULTGRAD 0.1406   0.2252   2.5971  ** 2.7065 *** 
DOUBLESHIFT -0.1494   0.1088   0.3434  1.7682 * 
BASEQUIP -0.0006   0.1821   -0.5981   
BOOKS 0.1032   -0.6293 **  0.5317   
GUIDE 0.0880   0.1247   0.0912   
ELECTR 0.3681 ** 0.3238 ** -0.4378 ** -0.3139 ** 0.4240   
TOWNFAR -0.5802 ** -0.3656 * 0.3605  0.4159 * -0.9554   
Teacher characteristics      
GENDER -0.2897 * -0.1789  -0.1894   0.0014   
ALONE -0.3628 * -0.3826 ** 0.4013 * 0.4029 ** -0.2933   
FRENCH 0.0799   -0.0271   0.1092   
LANGLOC -0.0947   -0.0184   0.1391   
EXPER -0.0108   -0.0069   -0.0654  -0.0328  
BACPLUS -0.5039 *** -0.4569 *** 0.2900 * 0.2816 ** -0.2800   
DIPLPED -0.4074  -0.3840 * 0.0351   0.2931   
NOSEM -0.1278   0.1787   -1.1886  -1.4180 ** 
Contract conditions      
VOLUNT -0.1281   0.7959 *** 0.6411 *** -2.6728  ** -3.1562 *** 
INTERIMDIR -0.4684 * -0.4404 * 0.2414   -1.3166  -1.2945  
AFAVISIT 0.4267 * 0.3388 * 0.0074   0.2282   
AGETPAY -0.2237  -0.1011  0.0159   0.7002  0.7405  
ASECJOB 0.2177   0.1777   2.2095  **  
TUITION 0.1247   0.1650   0.6623   
ACTIVITY 0.0649   -0.0276   1.6130  ** 1.7038 *** 
UNION 0.3811 ** 0.1065  0.1161   -1.0589  -0.5271  
PILOTPRG -0.0314   0.1224   -0.3240   
Exchange, support and control      
EXCHANGE -0.1656   0.1285   -0.1612   
MEET 0.0094   -0.0090   0.1723   
IINSPECT -0.1914   0.5105 ** 0.4767 *** -1.0154  -1.1612 * 
IADVICE 0.1558   -0.0956   -0.7706  -0.5946  
IMEETPAR 0.3299   -0.2257   1.2641  1.3972 * 
PTORGA -0.0062   0.2029  0.2016 * -0.3306   
ACTIVPAR -0.0350   -0.4309 *** -0.4438 *** 0.2337   
ASSOC -0.0112   -0.0784   0.5428  0.2692  
Overall job satisfaction      
JOBSATIS   -0.1331  -0.3027 ** -1.0953  * -0.9967 * 
Country dummies      
CI -0.6929 ** -0.6570 *** 0.5953 * 0.1794  -1.7338  -1.6692  
CM -0.3578  -0.3830  -0.0544  -0.2398  -1.7708  -1.8479 * 
MD -0.2103  -0.2331  -0.3849  -0.6262 *** -0.6743  -0.5572  
SN  -0.6074  -0.4814 ** -0.6985  -1.0166  5.3824  * 3.5481 *** 
Log likelihood -246.85  -320.709  -226.66  -287.25  -735.23  -808.05  
Restr. log likelihood -278.43  -348.775  -276.59  -340.98    
LR statistic 63.17 (39df) 56.13 (15df) 99.87 (40df) 107.47 (16df)  R²=0.21  R²=0.19 
Probabilitiy (LR stat) 0.01  1.15E-06  5.00E-07  1.33E-15   R²(adj.)=0.10  R²(adj.)=0.15 
Obs. with Dep=0 188  240  225  278  Censored obs. 133 Censored obs. 144 
Obs. with Dep=1 215  264  178  219  Uncens. obs. 220 Uncens. obs. 240 
       
       
Notes: *** significant at α=0.01, ** significant at α=0.05, * significant at α=0.10. 
To avoid perfect multicollinearity, the country dummy for Burkina Faso is omitted from the analysis. Burkina Faso thus becomes the county of comparison. 
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whether the school is situated in an urban area or at least close to it, or whether it is far 
away from any city (TOWNFAR). 
It appears that teachers are generally less satisfied with their profession when 
they have to teach classes with a high number of students and when they are posted to 
isolated rural areas.5 At the same time, school equipment plays a significant role, in 
particular concerning prestigious items such as electricity. These variables also 
influence the teachers’ desire to change schools. Contrary to basic items such as chalk, 
blackboard etc., the availability of textbooks plays a significant role here, too. 
Moreover, the desire for change is reduced in schools where students start off with a 
high level of initial knowledge. 
The factors influencing teachers’ absence from school seem to be different. 
Here, only the exceptional modes of class organization, i.e. both the multi-grade and the 
double-shift system, appear to exert a significant influence. Both systems lead to 
teachers being absent much more often. 
 
Teacher characteristics 
Regarding teachers’ own characteristics, Table 3 shows a similar divide between 
ABSENCE and the other two dependent variables. Absence appears to be significantly 
less prevalent only for teachers who do not attend any continuous training seminars 
(NOSEM) – probably implying that the attendance of these seminars generally takes 
place during school hours.  
CHANGE and JOBSATIS are both influenced by the teachers’ educational 
attainment. Contrary to expectations, satisfaction with both profession and working 
place is reduced when teachers’ attainment is high. This does not exclude that, as the 
famous model by Hackman and Oldham (1980) and other empirical studies (e.g. Ma 
1999) would suggest, knowledge of the job and teaching competence are relevant for 
teacher job satisfaction. However, it seems that once teachers hold the high-school 
degree “baccalauréat” (BACPLUS), they face a mismatch between their professional 
expectations and work realities. Potential positive effects via facilitated teaching and 
increased self-confidence appear to be more than counterbalanced by this negative 
effect. The effect is the same, but less pronounced, if they hold a pedagogical degree 
(DIPLPED). Similar results were found by Sim (1990) and Ho (1985) for secondary 
school teachers in Singapore.  
Language knowledge (LANGLOC and FRENCH) does not seem to play a 
significant role. Neither does the level of professional experience (EXPER). The two 
control variables indicating teachers’ sex (GENDER) and their family status (ALONE), 
                                                
5 Note that conversely, in some industrialized countries, some of the urban schools seem to be most 
disliked by the teachers (see e.g. Boyd et al. 2003 for the United States). 
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however, do seem to be relevant. It is little surprising to note that teachers staying alone 
without family tend to be more mobile than others. But at the same time, they display a 
generally lower level of job satisfaction. Moreover, on average, men seem to be less 
satisfied with their teaching job than women are. Similar results for other world regions 
were reported by Mwamwenda (1997), Ma (1999), Kremer-Hayon and Goldstein 
(1990), and Thompson, McNamara and Hoyle (1997). 
 
Contract conditions  
With respect to contract conditions, different groups of teachers can be 
distinguished. One particularly interesting group most highly represented in the 
Cameroonian sample are the so-called “voluntary” teachers (VOLUNT). These teachers 
are not civil servants, but work on private contracts of various durations and may be 
employed and paid by the school or even directly by their students’ parents. This 
implies that they generally receive lower salaries, have less job security, and that, at the 
same time, they are more directly responsible to their clients. While their representation 
in the PASEC sample of the late 1990s is still relatively limited, programs implying a 
massive employment of voluntary teachers have spread fast since then in numerous 
African countries. Accepted by policy makers as a means of increasing the number of 
teachers at relatively low cost, these programs often evoked fears with respect to the 
potentially negative effects on teachers’ job satisfaction and motivation.  
It is therefore interesting to note that, at least in the sample analyzed here, there 
is no significant effect on JOBSATIS. However, this voluntary teachers show an 
extremely strong desire to change schools – probably related to the hope of employment 
in a more secure government position elsewhere. At the same time, absence rates are 
significantly lower as compared to other teachers. The coefficients can be interpreted as 
an indication that, on average, voluntary teachers miss about 1.5 to 2 working days less 
per month.6 The contrast between the insignificant (but negative rather than positive) 
effect on JOBSATIS on the one hand, and the strong effect on reduced absenteeism on 
the other hand suggests that the latter may be the effect of direct control, personal 
responsibility and the fear of consequences for further employment.7  
The situation of voluntary teachers can be contrasted with the one of “interim 
directors” (INTERIMDIR), the second highest status group among primary teachers. 
This group of teachers enjoys stable civil servants’ employment contracts. Nevertheless, 
                                                
6 This is a crude approximation based on the fact that the marginal effect corresponds to the coefficient of 
the tobit regression multiplied by the probability of an observation between the two censoring limits.  
7 For India, Chaudhury et al. (2005) do not find the same effect of a non-civil servant status on absence 
rates. In this context, it should be noted that the specific contractual situation of voluntary or ‘contract’ 
teachers varies quite considerably across countries and over time, leading to incentive structures which 
may not always be fully comparable. 
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they appear generally to be the most disappointed regarding their job, since – as 
indicated by the significant and strongly negative coefficient – hardly any member of 
this group would choose the same profession again. 
The following variables indicate some features of teachers’ work realities from 
the directors’ point of view. The latter were asked to indicate the three major reasons for 
teacher absenteeism. Teachers in schools where directors pointed out family visits 
(AFAVISIT) as a major problem appear to be clearly more satisfied with their job. 
Apparently they enjoy this freedom and lack of control irrespective of the impact this 
may have on students’ learning. The necessity to collect salaries from far-away places 
(AGETPAY), indicated by a large number of directors in particular in Senegal, does not 
show any significant effect, however. And only the directors’ perception that teachers’ 
presence suffers from their second jobs (ASECJOB) is reflected in a significant and 
highly positive coefficient in the ABSENCE regressions indicating that the rate of 
absence is indeed considerably higher for this group of teachers. 
The latter result is confirmed by the teachers’ own statements about their 
additional occupations. They are captured here by the variable TUITION indicating 
whether the teacher gives private classes after school, and the variable ACTIVITY 
including any other kind of activity besides teaching. While the former shows no 
significant effect on any of the dependent variables, the latter leads to significantly 
increased rates of absence. Since this is not reflected by any apparent effect on the 
variable JOBSATIS, it might not necessarily indicate a low satisfaction with the 
teaching profession, but rather the desire or necessity to increase the family income, and 
the lack of control over whether this is done during class hours. 
Another factor that does play a significant and positive role with respect to 
teachers’ overall valuation of their profession is union membership (UNION). While 
this might indicate the support an individual teacher expects to get from a well-
organized group of peers, it might also indicate something about the perceived 
(political) strength of the teaching profession as a whole, thereby positively influencing 
the individual teacher’s self-esteem.  
Participation of the school in pilot programs or twinning with schools from 
abroad (PILOTPRG) does not seem to have any relevant effect on teachers’ job 
satisfaction. 
 
Exchange, support and control 
The final set of explanatory variables includes information on teachers’ 
professional working conditions as members of the school and town or village 
community. As opposed to other studies where communication among teachers and 
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with principals appeared to have a strongly positive impact on teacher job satisfaction 
(Verdugo et al. 1997, Whaley and Hegstrom 1992, Kloep and Tarifa 1994), this effect 
could not be detected based on the indicators available here. Neither exchange among 
teachers (EXCHANGE) nor the number of regular meetings with the principal and all 
other colleagues (MEET) shows a significant effect on any of the dependent variables. 
The role of the school inspector, however, appears to be very important. Teachers do 
not seem to appreciate it when he comes for a proper inspection, i.e. for control of 
individual teachers’ classroom practices (IINSPECT). As indicated by the strongly 
positive and highly significant effect on the variable CHANGE, teachers prefer to go to 
other schools to avoid this control. At the same time, on average, wherever this control 
takes place, absence rates per month are reduced by about one third of the average 
monthly absenteeism. When inspectors come only to give advice (IADVICE), this does 
not show any significant effect. And when they come to meet students’ parents 
(IMEETPAR), this actually seems to increase teachers’ absence from school - possibly 
because inspectors speak to parents and children so that neither teachers nor children 
attend their classes. 
Contact to parents also seems to be of a certain relevance. However, 
surprisingly, the role of active parent-teacher organizations (PTORGA) is apparently 
seen in a rather negative light by the teachers concerned. Where they exist, teachers tend 
to have a considerably higher desire to change schools. This might again indicate their 
propensity to avoid control. At the same time, teachers are much less willing to change 
their schools when parents are active in a more direct sense (ACTIVPAR), providing 
manpower or finance for additional equipment or other improvements at the teacher’s 
request. Teachers’ involvement in various kinds of social, local or other organizations 
(ASSOC), which might be expected to ease their integration into the local community 
and the contact with parents, does not show any significant effect. 
 
Interrelation of dependent variables 
Finally, looking at the interrelation of the three indicators of job satisfaction, it 
can be noted that JOBSATIS does indeed significantly influence both CHANGE and 
ABSENCE in the ways expected. While this was less obvious from bivariate 
correlations in Table 2, once other factors are controlled for, the relationship becomes 
clear. This supports the role of JOBSATIS as the central indicator for job satisfaction. 
While it is apparent from the above discussion that the three variables JOBSATIS, 
CHANGE and especially ABSENCE have certain differences in their determinants, 
these differences do not seem to arise from the coverage of different, complementary 
aspects of job satisfaction. They appear, rather, to be a result of other factors - unrelated 
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to job satisfaction - that are also captured by the variables CHANGE and ABSENCE. 
With respect to the latter, this has become most obvious when looking at factors that 
imply any sort of control: while the lack of control is generally appreciated by teachers, 
it apparently leads to higher rates of absenteeism. 
 
Other determinants 
Unfortunately, despite the richness of the PASEC dataset, a considerable number 
of potentially relevant factors could not be tested in the above regressions. Teachers’ 
autonomy and workload, for instance, are frequently considered in other studies (Perry, 
Chapman and Snyder 1995, pp. 118ff., Abu-Saad and Hendrix 1995, p. 149, Barnabé 
and Burns 1994, p. 179). Moreover, teacher salaries, an intensively debated and 
financially most relevant policy variable, could not be considered as a separate 
determinant. 
However, where the variance of omitted variables is most relevant on the cross-
national level, some of it may be captured by the country dummy variables. In fact, this 
could be true for salaries, since variation within countries should already have been 
taken into account indirectly, through teachers’ educational attainment, job experience 
and teaching status (e.g. voluntary teachers, interim directors etc.). Most of the 
remainder should be general cross-country differences in the level of average teacher 
salaries, and in the way these salaries have evolved over time. However, relating the 
coefficient estimates for country dummies to available information on average primary 
teacher salaries does not lead to any clear relationship. According to MINEDAF (2002) 
and Mingat and Suchaut (2000), teachers in Madagascar and Cameroon get by far the 
lowest relative salaries and yet, the dummy variables imply that teacher job satisfaction 
in these countries is relatively high, even after correction for all other variables.8 This 
does not necessarily imply that salaries have no influence on teacher job satisfaction, 
but it shows that, in any case, this influence is not strong enough to dominate other 
country-specific effects. This is consistent with Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin’s (1999) 
finding that salaries are only weakly related to teacher mobility and student 
performance. 
 
6.  Job satisfaction and learning outcomes 
Teacher job satisfaction can of course be regarded as an objective in itself, and as 
mentioned earlier, this is the case in many studies of educational scientists. Ultimately, 
it is often looked upon, however, as a means to promote good teaching and thus high 
                                                
8 There is no country dummy for Burkina Faso in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity. Burkina Faso 
thereby becomes the country of comparison. 
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education quality. In order to analyze this second link, earlier studies have generally 
needed to recur to problematic indirect indicators. Perry, Chapman and Snyder (1995) 
for instance, use the observation of differences in teaching methods that are assumed to 
be correlated to learning outcomes. As described in section 2, this is where the PASEC 
dataset has its comparative advantage since it provides direct information on student 
achievement on an internationally comparative basis both at the beginning and the end 
of the academic year.  
 
6.1. Methodology 
In order to test the link between teacher job satisfaction and education quality, student 
achievement at the end of the year (RATE2_S) can simply be regressed on JOBSATIS 
controlling for students’ initial knowledge (RATE1_S and RATESN1_S) and other 
relevant determinants of student learning.  
When computing the regression model, it has to be taken into account that 
information is available at two levels: 
 
(i) Level 1 – student level: achievement data, family characteristics etc.  
(ii) Level 2 – school or class level9: teacher and school characteristics,  
            classroom equipment etc. 
 
In this setting, school level observations for different students within the same 
class are obviously not independent of each other. The hierarchical data structure thus 
leads to a violation of the usual assumptions for OLS regressions and to downward 
biased OLS estimates for standard errors. However, the correct error structure can be 
captured using a simple two-level hierarchical linear model (HLM).10
 
For i=1,...,Nj students in j=1,...,J classes, this model can be written as: 
Level 1 (students): yij = Z ij α + X ij βj + rij
Level 2 (schools): βj = Bj ρ + uj
Reduced form:  yij = Z ij α + X ij Bj ρ + X ij uj + rij   , 
 
where yij is the dependent variable, Z ij are explanatory level 1 variables whose 
influence is independent of school level variables, and Bj are explanatory variables at 
level 2. The corresponding fixed coefficients are α and ρ, and rij and uj are residuals at 
                                                
9 School and class levels are identical here, since only one class is considered in each school. 
10 For more general information on HLM see Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) and Goldstein (2003). For a 
more complex application with cross level effects and three hierarchical levels equally based on PASEC 
data, see Michaelowa (2001a). 
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levels 1 and 2 respectively. The interesting feature is the link between both levels 
provided by the random coefficients βj that are introduced as coefficients for student 
level data X ij but explained by information available at school level. The reduced form 
of the model, which integrates both student and school level variables, finally differs 
from the ordinary regression model only through the term X ij uj. In the specification 
chosen here, X ij will simply represent a constant term whose coefficient is allowed to 
vary across schools. Therefore, the equation boils down to a simple random effects 
model (as known for instance from panel econometrics) whereby the random effects 
capture unobserved differences between individual schools. 
From the reduced form, it becomes obvious that the overall error term is X ij uj + 
rij whose covariance is inevitably different from zero for two students of the same 
school, even if the individual error terms are assumed to fulfill the usual conditions of 
having zero mean and being uncorrelated among each other and across different i or j.  
Estimating the reduced form of the model using ML techniques and the 
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm described in the technical appendix of Bryk 
and Raudenbush (1992) leads to the results presented in Table 4. While a greater 
number of control variables was introduced in earlier regressions (see e.g. Michaelowa 
2000 and 2001a), regression 7 displayed here is restricted to those variables with a 
significant or close to significant influence at a level of 10%, and to the country 
dummies. Regression 8 differs from regression 7 by introducing two further variables 
for comparison with the discussion in the previous section. Again, all variables are 
explained in detail in the appendix. 
 
6.2. Results 
It appears that indeed, as expected, teacher job satisfaction does exert a positive 
and significant influence on student learning. This may be interpreted as a translation of 
job satisfaction into motivation, i.e. higher effort on the job, which in turn leads to 
higher outcomes. As students’ initial knowledge (RATE1_S, RATESN1_S) is included 
as a control variable, there should be no risk of endogeneity bias resulting from the 
potential influence of students’ level of knowledge on job satisfaction. However, it 
cannot be excluded that an endogeneity bias arises with respect to students’ learning 
within the year of analysis. In this case, a cautious interpretation of the coefficient 
would imply to understand it as an upper limit of the true effect of teacher job 
satisfaction on student achievement.  
Among the control variables, at student level, each child’s initial knowledge 
plays the predominant role. Apart from that, children of higher age (AGEPLUS) and 
children having repeated one or several classes before reaching the fifth grade 
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(REPEAT2) seem to be at a disadvantage. Conversely, French speaking students 
(FRENCH_S), and students equipped with radio and/or television (MEDIA) and books 
(LIBRARY) at home, tend to perform better. A discussion of the results of other studies 
analyzing these and other student level determinants of educational outcomes can be 
found in Michaelowa (2000, 2001a) and Michaelowa and Wechtler (2006). 
 
Table 4:  Determinants of student achievement 
  
Dependent variable RATE2_S RATE2_S 
Method: HLM (2 levels) HLM (2 levels) 
N (number of student level observations) 6664 6664 
J (number of school level observations) 386 386 
Explanatory variables at student level Coefficients Regr. 7 Coefficients Regr. 8 
RATE1_S 0.520*** 0.520*** 
RATESN1_S 0.731*** 0.713*** 
AGEPLUS -0.013*** -0.013*** 
FRENCH_S 0.006* 0.005* 
REPEAT2 -0.010*** -0.010*** 
MEDIA 0.006*** 0.006*** 
LIBRARY 0.006** 0.006* 
Explanatory variables at school level Coefficients Regr. 7 Coefficients Regr. 8 
JOBSATIS 0.017** 0.016** 
VOLUNT 0.028* 0.026 
INSPECT 0.027** 0.028** 
TUITION  0.016 
ACTIVITY  -0.004 
EDUCATION 0.012*** 0.012*** 
TRAINING 0.017*** 0.017*** 
EXPER 0.006*** 0.006*** 
EXPER2 -0.000** -0.000** 
LANGLOC 0.014 0.014 
DOUBLESHIFT -0.025* -0.024* 
MULTGRAD 0.033* 0.033* 
STUDNUMB 0.002*** 0.002*** 
STUDNUMB2 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
BOOKS 0.030** 0.029** 
TOWN 0.014 0.013 
   
CI -0.037* -0.036** 
CM 0.005 0.007 
MD 0.001 0.002 
SN -0.079*** -0.080*** 
   
Overall fit of regression (as compared to the model empty at both levels simultaneously) 
R² (student level) 0.37 0.37 
R² (school level) 0.52 0.52 
Notes: *** significant at α=0.01, ** significant at α=0.05, * significant at α=0.10. 
In order to avoid perfect multicollinearity, the country dummy for Burkina Faso is omitted here.  
Burkina Faso thus becomes the country of comparison. 
 
Here however, it seems more relevant to move quickly to level 2 variables, and 
this not simply for the purpose of evaluating their influence on student learning, but 
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rather to discuss this influence in relation to the influence of the same variables with 
respect to teachers’ job satisfaction.  
Indeed, it should be noted that many of the variables already shown to be 
relevant for teachers’ job satisfaction also exert a direct influence on student 
achievement. Trying to combine the objectives of teacher job satisfaction and education 
quality is thus equivalent to selecting those factors which positively influence both 
variables or at least positively influence one without negatively influencing the other. 
Looking at individual coefficients, the relative efficiency of these strategies can also be 
determined. 
 
7.  Increasing both job satisfaction and education quality 
Trying to combine the objectives of teacher job satisfaction and student achievement, 
the easiest procedure seems to be to check – one by one –the coefficients of level 2 
variables presented in Table 4 and to compare them with the results from section 4. 
The first two variables give some indication on teachers’ reaction to 
performance incentives. As mentioned earlier, in developing and industrialized 
countries alike, this issue has raised much interest in recent years (see e.g. Lavy 2002 
and 2004, Hanushek 2002, Eberts, Hollenbeck and Stone 2002, Khan 2002). Moreover, 
the VOLUNT variable appears to be particularly relevant from the viewpoint of current 
reforms of the teaching profession in many African countries. It turns out that despite 
their typically lower salary and relatively insecure contract position, voluntary teachers 
tend to perform better than their colleagues. In regression 7, the coefficient is 
significant, and in regression 8 it is almost significant at the level of 10%. Regressions 5 
and 6 also showed that voluntary teachers are absent from work considerably less often 
than other teachers. At the same time, regressions 3 and 4 provided some evidence of 
the fact, that teachers do not particularly appreciate this type of contract situation. In 
fact, it might be precisely the hope of achieving a better and more secure position in the 
civil service that induces voluntary teachers to take their work very seriously and to 
perform comparatively well. It may also be that the threat of losing their post acts as an 
extrinsic motivator. Apparently, with respect to the contract situation, there is thus a 
conflicting relation between the teachers’ level of well-being and the control and 
incentive mechanisms to induce good teaching practices.  
This conflict is known from the broader literature on the relationship between 
economic incentives and intrinsic motivation. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) and 
Bénabou and Tirole (2003) analyze situations in which rewards or punishments may 
crowd out intrinsic motivation. Regression results from regressions 7 and 8 suggest that 
even taking potential crowding out into account, voluntary teacher contracts seem to be 
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rather effective. The coefficient estimates for VOLUNT is considerably higher than the 
(potentially even overestimated) coefficient for JOBSATIS. Moreover, it should be kept 
in mind that in the initial regressions, the negative impact of VOLUNT on JOBSATIS 
was not even significant. All in all, our evidence does not lend any support to fears that 
voluntary teacher programs may undermine education quality. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that recent large scale voluntary teacher 
programs are carried out in different ways in the different countries concerned. The 
implications for both teacher incentives and motivation vary accordingly, and it cannot 
surprise that evaluations of these programs in different countries also show largely 
diverging effects on student achievement (see e.g. CONFEMEN/PASEC 2003, 2004a, 
2004b, 2004c, and Bourdon, Frölich and Michaelowa 2006). However, clearly, the 
available evidence reveals that the conditions most favored by teachers do not always 
correspond to the situation which is optimal for students’ learning. 
The situation is similar as far as inspections of classroom practices are 
concerned. Again, previous regressions showed that the control effect related to these 
inspections is strongly disliked by the teachers concerned. At the same time, 
regressions 7 and 8 show that these inspections are clearly performance enhancing.11 
Just as for VOLUNT, the coefficient of INSPECT is much higher than the coefficient of 
JOBSATIS, so that this result holds even if the potential crowding-out of intrinsic 
motivation is taken into account.  
Private tuition (TUITION) and other activities (ACTIVITY) are often believed 
to be the major vehicle translating bad financial teaching conditions into bad teaching 
performance. UNICEF (1999, p. 39) states that low salaries force many primary school 
teachers in Africa into other activities, often to the detriment of teaching – as shown 
above by the effect of ACTIVITY on ABSENCE in regressions 5 and 6. The African 
Development Bank (AfDB 1998, p. 197) goes even further identifying low salaries as 
the factor the most harmful for the education system altogether and suggesting that 
teachers tend to reserve their pedagogical skills and material for the more highly 
remunerated private tuition in the afternoon. However, these effects which are included 
in regression 8 do not turn out to be significant here. As suggested in Michaelowa 
(2000), reasons might be that teachers following other activities are generally more 
dynamic, and that private tuition often benefits a teacher’s own students – even though 
this leads to a hidden additional cost of schooling which may be difficult to bear for 
many families. 
                                                
11 Note that in the context of regressions 7 and 8, no significant differences could be made out between 
various objectives of an inspector’s visit, so that for simplification, these visits are presented in a single 
variable INSPECT here. 
 22 
Looking now at teachers’ educational attainment (EDUCATION) and 
participation in training seminars (TRAINING), the results in Table 4 indicate a clearly 
positive impact on students’ learning. Unfortunately, and contrary to what might have 
been expected, higher educational attainment appeared to have a negative rather than 
positive influence on job satisfaction in regressions 1-4. It should be noted, however, 
that this negative relationship was shown with respect to only one specific level of 
education, the baccalauréat (BACPLUS). It is less pronounced (although still 
significant) if the variable EDUCATION is used that allows for gradually increasing 
levels of education from 6th grade onwards. This suggests that, while teachers with high 
educational attainment might be discouraged by their professional career perspectives, 
the negative relationship does not necessarily hold for very low attainment levels. In 
fact, extremely low levels of teachers’ educational attainment might be equally 
discouraging due to the difficulties faced with regard to competently carrying out their 
job. In any case, if the intention is to improve both teachers’ job satisfaction and student 
achievement, raising teachers’ educational level beyond the baccalauréat does not seem 
to be a sensible policy measure. This is interesting to note since this excludes one 
particularly costly policy measure given that higher educational attainment is generally 
accompanied by higher pay. 
The effects of teachers’ experience (EXPER, EXPER2) and their knowledge of 
the local language (LANGLOC) are of less interest here. Neither of the two variables 
showed any significant impact on job satisfaction. With respect to student achievement, 
the positive coefficient of LANGLOC remains slightly below the 10% level of 
significance, too. Increasing job experience initially fosters student achievement, but the 
positive effect fades out after some time and then even becomes negative. In any case, 
EXPER is a mere control variable that cannot be used for policy-making.  
With respect to policy-making, it is very interesting, however, to consider the 
variables of class management (DOUBLESHIFT and MULTGRAD) as well as class 
size (STUDNUMB, STUDNUMB2). In regressions 1 and 2, a big class size was shown 
to have a clearly negative impact on teacher job satisfaction. Just as in the case of 
salaries, it is often assumed that reducing class size might be a perfect tool to improve 
both teacher job satisfaction and education quality. However, the link between class size 
and educational outcomes is less clear than it might appear. Hanushek (1998) provides 
an interesting overview over a large number of studies with very mixed results. 
Michaelowa (2001b) provides details for the relationship in each of the five countries 
considered here. Overall, it appears from regressions 7 and 8 that the impact follows a 
quadratic function. Based on the regression estimates, it can be calculated that – at least 
under prevailing teaching methods – a negative impact of increased student numbers 
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can be felt only from about 65 students onwards. Even then, the impact remains 
relatively moderate and does not increase very fast. While the effect of reduced student 
numbers is thus strongly relevant for teachers’ well-being, its impact on student learning 
is far less obvious. 
With respect to the effect of the double-shift class structure, however, there 
finally appears to be a correspondence between both the negative effect on teachers’ job 
satisfaction and the negative effect on education quality. Double-shift classes often put 
teachers under considerable strain since they generally have to deal with two 
consecutive groups of students, without much time for preparation in between. At the 
same time, the students of each group often spend a reduced time-period in school, even 
if this is not always intended by educational planners. A further problem might be that 
timings are often problematic for at least one group with respect to climatic influences 
(e.g. heat in the early afternoon) or life rhythms (e.g. having to get up very early without 
breakfast).12 In any case, this system apparently leads to considerably reduced student 
achievement and an increased absence of teachers from their work. 
Since double-shift classes are generally introduced to cope with high student 
numbers, it is interesting to compare the effect of this variable with the impact of class 
size. Given the parameter estimates of regressions 7 and 8, it can be calculated that only 
with a class size of over 100 students does it make sense to divide the class into two 
groups.13 This reasoning is based merely on grounds of educational quality and does not 
take into account that double-shift management also implies additional costs. Even if no 
extra teacher is employed, the existing teacher has to be paid for additional working 
hours, and often at expensive overtime rates. 
With respect to teacher job satisfaction, regression 1 indicates that the loss of 
well-being due to a double-shift structure is higher than the loss of well-being due to 
about 20 additional students in the class. However, this calculation has to be considered 
with some caution, since the variable DOUBLESHIFT is not significant in regression 1. 
Teachers’ attitude towards the multi-grade system is less clear. This specific 
type of class management appears to have a positive rather than a negative impact on 
student achievement. However, as shown in regressions 5 and 6, it goes hand in hand 
with surprisingly high rates of teacher absenteeism. At the same time, teachers do not 
show any particular disliking of the system, since the coefficient of MULTGRAD is 
non- significant (and even positive) with respect to JOBSATIS in regression 1. All in 
                                                
12 For these and other possible reasons of the negative impact of double-shift classes, see CONFEMEN 
(2003). 
13 Given the regression coefficients in regressions 7 and 8, the exact number of students for which the 
options of double-shift and single-class organization lead to the same overall achievement is 105. Since 
the calculation is based on estimates, however, the exactitude of this figure should not be overvalued. 
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all, the multi-grade system appears to be a sensible management tool that is not in 
conflict with the objectives of education quality and teacher job satisfaction. However, 
it should be remembered that it is a tool relevant only for specific situations of small 
student numbers in remote areas. Moreover, further analysis is needed considering the 
high rates of teacher absenteeism it implies.  
Concerning the relevance of classroom equipment, regressions 7 and 8 indicate a 
clearly positive effect of textbooks on student learning. At the same time, regressions 3 
and 4 suggest that the availability of textbooks also has a positive impact on teacher job 
satisfaction. Improving the availability of textbooks might thus indeed be a valuable and 
generally applicable instrument to improve both teachers’ job satisfaction and education 
quality. Some caution is required, though, since the effect on job satisfaction is 
significant only with respect to the variable CHANGE thereby indicating teachers’ 
desire to teach at those schools which are best equipped. This might partly reflect the 
tendency to choose the relatively most prestigious schools, rather than a positive 
valuation of books as a relevant tool of instruction. It should in fact be considered that 
when textbooks are newly introduced teachers need to spend time and effort to adjust to 
the new methods of instruction. Possibly, the positive effect of the availability of 
textbooks on job satisfaction would come out more clearly in the regressions of 
JOBSATIS as well, if teachers were generally provided with pedagogical support and 
training for the adjustment period. All in all, however, even as the situation is now, 
improving the availability of textbooks appears to be a relevant policy measure that, in 
addition, can be implemented at relatively low cost. 
Finally, it can be noted that teachers not only prefer to teach in urban schools or 
schools close to urban areas, but that these schools also tend to provide better learning 
conditions (even though this effect is not fully significant since many related variables 
have already been controlled for). Unfortunately, however, this is no relevant policy 
variable, since broad educational coverage requires rural schools. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Given the relevant determinants of teacher job satisfaction analyzed in section 4 and the 
relevant determinants of student achievement presented in sections 5 and 6, evidence in 
this paper is consistent with the expectation that there is a positive impact of teacher job 
satisfaction on education quality and that therefore, education quality can be influenced 
by influencing teacher job satisfaction. 
However, since many variables have a simultaneous direct impact on both 
teacher job satisfaction and student achievement, not all factors positively influencing 
teacher job satisfaction will actually lead to better educational outcomes. In fact, as 
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discussed in section 6, in many cases the relationship between the objectives of 
improving job satisfaction and student achievement is conflicting rather than 
complementary. In particular, variables implying a control system and incentive 
structures based on a lack of job security seem to have considerable positive effects on 
teachers’ performance while, at the same time, they appear to be strongly disapproved 
by the teachers concerned. This conflict between the objectives of raising education 
quality and improving teachers’ job satisfaction is particularly obvious with respect to 
the impact of inspections and non civil service teaching contracts. 
There are only a few variables, in fact, the impact of which is unambiguously 
positive regarding both objectives. One is related to classroom equipment, which clearly 
shows a positive effect on teachers’ well-being. Among the equipment variables, many 
do not show any significant influence on student achievement, and were therefore not 
even presented in the regressions in section 6. This is different, however, for students’ 
equipment with textbooks, which is both highly relevant for student achievement, and 
positively related to teacher job satisfaction. Improving the availability of textbooks is 
therefore certainly a relevant policy choice. 
Another interesting feature is the correspondence between the negative effect of 
double-shift classes on student learning, and the disliking of teachers for this type of 
class management. It becomes clear that for both teachers and students, increasing class 
size would generally be the preferable measure to deal with high student numbers. The 
negative effect of double-shift classes is so strong that this is true for class sizes up to 
about 100 students. 
The frequently stated hypothesis that low salaries and plethoric class sizes are 
the major source of both low teacher job satisfaction and low student performance does 
not find much support here. Admittedly, teachers’ salaries are only indirectly measured 
through specific contract conditions and country dummies, and additional information 
on individual teachers’ salaries is required to further analyze their impact.  
Class size does have a considerably negative impact on teacher job satisfaction. 
Reducing class size would, however, imply engaging more teachers and thereby 
considerably increase costs. At the same time, the negative impact on educational 
outcomes seems to be relevant only from a high level of about 65 students onwards. 
Even then the effect of additional students remains moderate. In this context, and given 
the relevance of improved access to education in all of the African countries considered 
here, reducing class size should not become a general policy priority. 
Finally, it should be noted that a certain conflict between the objectives of 
teacher job satisfaction and student achievement also arises with respect to teachers’ 
own qualification level. While there is a uniformly positive relationship between their 
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level of educational attainment and educational outcomes, teachers beyond a certain 
level of qualification (in particular, the baccalauréat) appear to be very disappointed 
about the realities of their professional life. This result should be taken into account 
when it is considered raising the academic requirements for entering the teaching 
profession, especially since, just as reducing class size and increasing teacher salaries, 
this is one of the more expensive measures to improve the education systems in these 
countries.  
All in all, it can be concluded that the most intensively debated and highly cost-
intensive policy measures often assumed to be of major importance for both teacher job 
satisfaction and student achievement do not find much support in the analysis of this 
study. However, simple and relatively cheap measures such as the provision of 
textbooks seem to be unambiguously positive. Moreover, since conflicts between the 
objectives of teacher job satisfaction and education quality appear to be more relevant 
than expected, it may become unavoidable to promote one objective to the detriment of 
the other. For instance, one would probably not be willing to give up performance 
enhancing inspections, simply because teachers seem to dislike control. Moreover, one 
should further encourage the employment of voluntary teachers with flexible non civil 
servant contracts, which appear to be an efficient and performance enhancing means to 
increase the number of teachers. As the concrete structure of voluntary teacher 
programs varies quite considerably from country to country, ongoing PASEC country 
evaluations can be expected to provide interesting additional insights into the optimal 
implementation of these reforms in the future.  
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Appendix  
 
Variable definitions  
 
   
ABSENCE Number of days teacher was absent from school during the last month 
(max=25) 
 
ACTIVITY Dummy (teacher follows other non teaching/school related activities, such as 
farming, shop-keeping etc.=1, no such activities=0) 
 
ACTIVPAR Dummy (students’ parents are easily mobilized =1, cannot easily be mobilized =0) 
AFAVISIT Dummy (director feels that family visits are one of the major three reasons for 
teacher absenteeism =1, else =0) 
AGEPLUS Dummy (age>11 =1, age<=11 =0)  
AGETPAY Dummy (director feels that travel to fetch salaries is one of the major three reasons 
for teacher absenteeism =1, else =0) 
ALONE Dummy (teacher living alone =1, living with his or her family =0) 
ASECJOB Dummy (director feels that teachers’ second jobs are one of the major three 
reasons for teacher absenteeism =1, else =0) 
ASSOC Number of pedagogical, social or village associations the teacher is a member 
of 
 
BACPLUS Dummy (teacher has attained at least a high-school degree “baccalauréat” =1, 
else=0) 
 
BASEQUIP Dummy (basic equipment available=1, not available=0) 
“Basic equipment“ includes: teacher’s desk, usable blackboard, seats and desks 
for all students, white chalk, pencils and copy-books or slates for at least 75% 
of the students. 
 
BOOKS Share of students equipped with textbooks, average for math and French. When 
data were available for only one subject, the share in this subject was used as a 
proxy for the overall share. 
 
C Constant 
CHANGE Dummy (teacher would like to change the school =1, would like to remain in the 
same school =0) 
CI Country dummy for Côte d’Ivoire  
CM Country dummy for Cameroon 
DIPLPED Dummy (teacher holds a pedagogical diploma =1, doesn’t hold any  =0) 
DOUBLESHIFT Dummy (several classes using the same room at different times of the day=1, 
else=0) 
EDUCATION (0,1,…,6) Teacher’s educational attainment (below 6th grade=0, 6th or 7th 
grad=1, 8th or 9th grade=2, 10th or 11th grade=3, baccalauréat=4, bac. + 1 or 2 
years of tertiary education=5, 3 years or more of tertiary education=6) 
 
ELECTR Dummy (electricity available in class = 1, else = 0)  
EXCHANGE Dummy (teacher often (or very often) asks his colleagues for advice=1, else=0) 
EXPER Number of years of teaching experience  
EXPER2 EXPER squared  
FRENCH_S Dummy (French spoken at home=1, not spoken=0)  
FRENCH Dummy (teacher always or often speaking French outside classes=1, else=0)  
GENDER Dummy (male teacher=1, female teacher=0) 
GUIDE (0,1,2) Teacher’s manual for math and French available=2, for one subject=1, 
for none of the two=0 
 
IADVICE Dummy (visit of the inspector since the beginning of the year to give advice =1, 
else =0) 
IINSPECT Dummy (visit of the inspector since the beginning of the year to do an inspection 
=1, else =0) 
IMEETPAR Dummy (visit of the inspector since the beginning of the year to meet students’ 
parents =1, else =0) 
INSPECT Dummy (visit of the inspector since the beginning of the year=1, else=0) 
INTERIMDIR Dummy (teacher has the status of an interim director =1, else =0)  
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JOBSATIS Dummy (teacher would again choose the same profession=1, would not=0)  
LANGLOC Dummy (teacher speaks local language=1, does not speak=0)  
LIBRARY Dummy (student can use books at home=1, can’t use=0)  
LIT_P   (0,1,2) Both parents literate=2, mother or father literate=1, both illiterate=0  
MD Country dummy for Madagascar  
MEALS (3,2,1,0) Regular breakfast, lunch and dinner=3, only two regular meals=2, 
only one=1, none=0 
 
MEDIA (0,1,2) Availability at home of: radio and television=2, radio or television=1, 
neither of the two=0 
 
MEET (0,1,2,3,4) Director holds a meeting with all teachers at least once a week=4, 
once a month=3, once per trimester=2, once a year=1, never=0 
 
MULTGRAD Dummy (students of several grades together in one class=1, else=0) 
NOSEM Dummy (teacher attended no training course within the last five years=1, else =0), 
only for teachers with at least 3 years of job experience 
PILOTPRG Dummy (school participates in a special program=1, else=0). This special program 
can be a pilot program, an exchange program with another (foreign) school, an 
NGO financed project etc. 
PTORGA Sum of activity level of different types of school committees and associations, e.g. 
parent-teacher organizations (for each: very active=1, active=0.5, slightly 
active=0.1, not active at all=0) 
RATE1 Average student’s share of correct answers in the pre-test (average for math and 
French), for all countries but Senegal (average for all students tested in a particular 
class) 
RATE1_S Individual student’s share of correct answers in the pre-test (average for math and 
French), for all countries but Senegal 
RATE2_S Individual student’s share of correct answers in the post-test (average for math and 
French), for all countries 
RATESN1 Average student’s share of correct answers in the pre-test (average for math and 
French), for Senegal (average for all students tested in a particular class) 
RATESN1_S Individual student’s share of correct answers in the pre-test (average for math and 
French), for Senegal 
REPEAT2  Number of grades repeated before the 5th grade 
SN Country dummy for Senegal 
STUDNUMB Average number of students attending classes 
STUDNUMB2 STUDNUMB squared 
TOWN Dummy (urban school=1, rural school=0) 
TOWNFAR Dummy (closest town more than 2 hours away by fastest available means of 
transportation =1, next city at a closer distance=0) 
TRAINING Number of training courses followed per year during the last five years 
TUITION Dummy (teacher gives private tuition=1, does not=0) 
UNION Dummy (teacher is union member=1, non member=0) 
VOLUNT Dummy (teacher is not a civil servant=1, civil servant=0) 
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